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Abstract 
It is often assumed that, once established, spontaneous or implicit evaluations are resistant to 
immediate change. Recent research contradicts this theoretical stance, showing that a person’s 
implicit evaluations of an attitude object can be changed rapidly in the face of new counter-
attitudinal information. Importantly, it remains unknown whether such changes can also occur for 
deep-rooted implicit evaluations of well-known attitude objects. We address this question by 
examining whether the acquisition of negative information changes implicit evaluations of a 
well-known positive historic figure: Mahatma Gandhi. We report three experiments showing 
rapid changes in implicit evaluations of Gandhi as measured with an Affect Misattribution 
Procedure and Evaluative Priming Task but not with an Implicit Association Test (IAT). These 
findings suggest that implicit evaluations based on deep-rooted representations are subjective to 
rapid changes in the face of expectancy-violating information, while pointing to limitations of the 
IAT for assessing such changes.  
Keywords: implicit evaluation, attitude change, counter-attitudinal information, IAT 
 
  
CHANGING IMPLICIT EVALUATIONS OF GANDHI   3 
Changing Deep-rooted Implicit Evaluation in the Blink of an Eye:  
Negative Verbal Information Shifts Automatic Liking of Gandhi 
How novel information changes evaluation is one of the core questions in attitude 
research. A particularly interesting case is when people learn counter-attitudinal information 
about attitude objects with which they have had consistently positive or consistently negative 
experiences over a long period of time. Imagine, for example, that people in romantic 
relationships find out that their trusted partners have been cheating on them; that loyal customers 
of a product learn that this product is made by child labor; or that long-time supporters of a 
presidential candidate wake up to news about a scandal involving the candidate. In these cases, 
will people update their evaluations on the basis of the new and shocking information, or are their 
evaluations too deeply rooted to change? Answers to this question are of great significance, as 
evaluative changes can lead to important behavioral changes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005), such as 
choosing to end a relationship, stop buying a product, or vote for another presidential candidate.  
In the present paper, we focus on a particular type of evaluation that has received much 
attention in contemporary attitude research: implicit evaluation, defined as spontaneous 
evaluative responses emitted under conditions of automaticity (e.g., unintentional, uncontrolled, 
unconscious, or fast; De Houwer, 2009). Interestingly, initial research suggested that counter-
attitudinal information does not produce observable changes in implicit evaluation, even when 
such changes are observed in self-reported, explicit evaluation (see Gawronski & Sritharan, 2010, 
for a review). For instance, Gregg, Seibt, and Banaji (2006) observed that implicit evaluations of 
novel social groups could be induced easily on the basis of verbal information about the 
behaviors and traits of those groups, but, in contrast to explicit evaluations, they could not be 
undone by counter-attitudinal information about those groups. Because implicit evaluations can 
continue to influence behavior even when one rejects such evaluations at the explicit level (e.g., 
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in self-report measures), they are often considered to play a key role in so called irrational or 
unwanted behavior (e.g., psychopathology: Roefs et al., 2011; addiction: Wiers & Stacy, 2006; 
racial prejudice: Banaji & Greenwald, 2013).  
The findings that implicit evaluations can be resistant to immediate change were often 
considered as supportive to the notion that implicit evaluation reflects the automatic activation of 
associations between representations in memory (e.g., representations of positive or negative 
concepts and attitude objects) (for a review, see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). 
A key assumption of this view is that, once established, such associations cannot easily be 
modified or erased. Instead, changes in implicit evaluation might require a gradual “re-wiring” of 
associations, which occurs mainly on the basis of repeated pairing of the attitude object with 
counter-attitudinal information (e.g., through evaluative conditioning: Hofmann, De Houwer, 
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010, or approach-avoidance training: Kawakami, Phills, Steele, 
& Dovidio, 2007).  
The early idea (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000) that implicit evaluation can be changed 
only via slow and incremental formation of associations was, however, challenged by recent 
studies demonstrating that, under certain conditions, implicit evaluations of target individuals can 
be revised on the basis of a single piece of verbal information (Brennan & Gawronski, 2017, 
Cone & Ferguson, 2015, Mann & Ferguson, 2015, Wyer, 2016). For instance, in Cone and 
Ferguson’s studies, participants were exposed to a large amount of positive behavioral 
descriptions of a person named Bob so that they formed positive implicit evaluations of Bob. 
These positive evaluations, however, were immediately revised when the participants 
encountered a single piece of highly negative information about Bob (e.g., ‘Bob was convicted of 
molesting children’). These results have important implications for understanding the 
mechanisms underlying implicit evaluation and for developing effective methods for changing 
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(unwanted) behaviors known to be predicted by automatic evaluations. 
Notably, however, studies showing rapid revision of implicit evaluation have, until now, 
focused exclusively on changing recently formed evaluations of novel attitude objects (e.g., a 
stranger named Bob). This poses an important limitation to the theoretical implications of the 
findings, as associations underlying implicit evaluations of novel attitude objects might be weak 
and therefore susceptible to counter-attitudinal information (Hu, Gawronski, & Balas, 2017). In 
contrast, implicit evaluations of (certain) well-known attitude objects might be more deep-rooted 
in that they result from repeated exposure to evaluatively consistent information across multiple 
contexts and over a long period of time (e.g., over multiple decades). According to associative 
accounts (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000), deep-rooted implicit evaluations might reflect firmly 
established associations that have been formed gradually and incrementally during long-term 
socialization experiences. From this perspective, changes in such evaluations, as opposed to 
recently learned evaluations of novel objects, should be especially unlikely to arise quickly. At 
the practical level, the real-life relevance of providing counter-attitudinal verbal information as a 
means to change implicit evaluation would be severely limited if it would affect only novel 
attitude objects. Hence, it is important to test whether counter-attitudinal information can also 
lead to changes in deep-rooted implicit evaluations of well-known attitude objects.  
Some studies have already demonstrated rapid changes in (deep-rooted) implicit 
evaluations of well-known attitude objects that are ambiguous (i.e., with both positive and 
negative evaluative features). For instance, Smith and De Houwer (2015) observed that smokers’ 
implicit evaluations of smoking became more negative after they read anti-smoking messages. In 
these cases, however, changes in implicit evaluations might reflect context-dependent activation 
of existing positive or negative aspects of the overall representation of the ambiguous attitude 
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object, instead of the integration of new information into this representation (Mitchell, Nosek, & 
Banaji, 2003; see Blair, 2002, for a review). To make sure that any potential changes in implicit 
evaluations of well-known attitude objects are not merely instances of context-dependent 
malleability of implicit evaluations, it is important to examine attitude objects that are 
unambiguously positive or negative. For such unambiguous targets, any effect of counter-
attitudinal information is likely to be due to new learning rather than selective activation of 
existing old information. 
In the present study, we examined whether deep-rooted implicit evaluations of a well-
known and unambiguously positive attitude object – Mahatma Gandhi – can be quickly changed 
on the basis of novel information. We use the term deep-rooted to describe an evaluation that is 
(1) learned a long time ago, (2) held with a strong level of confidence, and (3) highly accessible. 
In a pre-registered study with a sample of participants (N = 100) that were recruited in the same 
way as the participants of Experiments 2 and 3, we examined whether participants’ evaluations of 
Gandhi fit this definition of deep-rooted. Results showed that, on average, participants first 
learned about Gandhi when they were 13 years old (22 years ago on average). Moreover, 
compared to other famous people (i.e., the ten most famous historical people as proposed by 
Skiena & Ward, 2013), participants (1) felt more confident about their evaluation of Gandhi and 
(2) were faster in the speeded evaluation of Gandhi (indicating greater accessibility of the 
evaluation: Fazio, Powell, & Williams, 1989). In this study, we also asked participants to indicate 
their liking of Gandhi and to complete an attitude ambivalence measure (Thompson, Zanna, & 
Griffin, 1995). Results indicated that (1) participants had mostly positive explicit evaluations of 
Gandhi and (2) participants felt less ambivalent towards Gandhi compared to other famous 
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people (with low ambivalence scores for Gandhi, overall, according to criteria of Thompson et 
al.).1 
For most people, the information that they previously learned about Gandhi is likely to be 
consistently positive, such as stories about his peaceful movement for civil rights and freedom 
around the world and numerous positive traits ascribed to him (e.g., faithful, persistent, peaceful). 
Unbeknownst to most people, however, certain past actions of Gandhi do not accord with this 
predominantly positive view. We performed three experiments, in which we told participants 
about such past actions of Gandhi and examined subsequent changes in implicit evaluations.  
Method 
Participants and design 
In Experiment 1, a total of 64 native Dutch-speaking undergraduates (46 women) were 
recruited from a participant pool at Ghent University, Belgium. In Experiments 2 and 3, 205 and 
150 participants (Experiment 2: 84 women; Experiment 3: 56 women) were recruited from the 
online participant recruitment platform Prolific Academia (https://www.prolific.ac/). In each 
experiment, we adopted a different implicit evaluation measure that has been widely used in 
previous research: the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) 
in Experiment 1, the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP, Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 
2005) in Experiment 2, and the Evaluative Priming Task (EPT, Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986) in Experiment 3. The main reason for including different measures is that these 
measures have been shown to be sensitive to different non-evaluative factors and therefore 
sometimes produce divergent findings (De Houwer, 2003; Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014).  
-                                                 
1 A more detailed description of the results as well as the pre-registered plan, data, and analysis code for this study 
are available at https://osf.io/b6t5a/. 
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Sample sizes were determined on the basis of an a priori power analysis taking into 
account the results of the previous experiments such that the sample size would provide sufficient 
power (i.e., power > 0.75) to detect a medium effect in Experiment 1 (d ≈ 0.60) and a small to 
medium effect in Experiments 2 (d ≈ 0.35) and 3 (d ≈ 0.40). Prior to data-collection, target 
sample size was pre-registered together with the study design, data-analysis plan and the 
described hypotheses for all experiments on the Open Science Framework website 
(https://osf.io). The pre-registered plans, experiment script, stimuli, data, and analysis code are 
available at https://osf.io/56xmy/.  
In line with recommendations by Zhou and Fishbach (2016) to prevent selective attrition, 
on line participants were informed about the duration of the experiment and warned that dropping 
out could negatively affect science. Overall dropout rate was 5.4% (Experiment 2) and 4.0% 
(Experiment 3). The dropout rates were comparable across the two text conditions, χ2s < 1.01, ps 
> .35. Hence, there was no evidence for condition-dependent attrition.  
Following our preregistered data-analysis plans, we excluded the data from participants 
who (1) had error rates above 30% when considering all critical IAT test blocks or above 40% for 
any one of these blocks (Experiment 1: 2 participants, 3.1%), (2) responded either “positive” or 
“negative” to all AMP trials in any of the AMP blocks (Experiment 2: 11 participants, 5.7%), or 
(3) had error rates in the EPT that exceeded the population mean by more than 2.5 standard 
deviations (Experiment 3: 4 participants, 2.8%). Analyses were performed on the data of 62, 183, 
and 140 participants. 
Procedure 
After providing informed consent, participants were told that they would read a text that 
describes historically true events. They were instructed to read the text thoroughly so that they 
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would be able to answer questions about it in a later phase of the experiment. In Experiments 1 
and 3, participants were then presented with a text about Mahatma Gandhi. Participants in 
Experiment 2 completed an AMP assessing implicit evaluations of Gandhi before reading the 
text. In all experiments, half of the participants read a text that described how, due to religious 
reasons, Gandhi refused the use of modern medicines on his sick wife who died afterwards, yet 
allowed the same treatment on himself and recovered when he fell ill shortly thereafter (negative 
Gandhi text). The other participants read a text that described how Gandhi lived in South-Africa 
for a short while (neutral Gandhi text). This text was descriptive in nature and did not refer to any 
of the normatively good or bad actions that Gandhi had done in his life. Texts were adapted 
versions of historical texts about Gandhi (Chadha, 1997; Wolpert, 2001) and are provided in the 
Supplementary Material. 
The reading task was followed by an implicit evaluation task for half of the participants. 
The other participants first completed explicit ratings. In Experiment 1, the implicit evaluation 
task was an IAT in which participants categorized eight attribute words (e.g., the Dutch words for 
pleasant and evil) as ‘bad’ or ‘good’ and the names of Gandhi (Gandhi or Mahatma Gandhi) and 
four other Indian people (e.g., Sristavi or Zohar Ganguly) as ‘Gandhi’ or ‘Not Gandhi’. Because 
there is strong evidence that intentional recoding of IAT categories can produce unwanted IAT 
effects (Rothermund, Teige-Mocigemba, Gast, & Wentura, 2009), we used an IAT that is 
designed to disentangle these processes from attitudinal processes with a Process Dissociation 
Procedure (the ReAL model for IAT performance). The IAT followed the procedure described in 
more detail by Meissner and Rothermund (2013) with the exception of the target categories and 
target stimuli that were used. 
Participants in Experiment 2 completed the AMP before and after reading the Gandhi text. 
In line with standard procedures (Payne et al., 2005), the AMP consisted of 80 trials in which 
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participants were presented with a prime stimulus for 75ms, a blank screen for 125ms, and a 
Chinese ideograph for 100ms, which was then covered with a black-and-white pattern mask. 
Participants were asked to indicate if they considered the Chinese ideograph more or less visually 
pleasant than average by pressing either “E” or “I”, respectively. Gandhi-related priming stimuli 
included the Gandhi names (Gandhi or Mahatma Gandhi) as well as four black and white 
photographs of Gandhi. Control priming stimuli included two random letter strings of equal 
length to the Gandhi names (GLjnkO or MfBznXh HgJszr) and four black and white photographs 
of other men that were rated as evaluatively neutral in a previous validation study.  
In Experiment 3, participants completed an EPT that adopted standard procedures 
(Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007). The EPT comprised 8 practice trials and 80 test 
trials. A single trial consisted of the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, a blank screen for 
500 ms, a prime for 200 ms, a post-prime interval for 50 ms, and the presentation of a target word 
for a maximum of 1500 ms. Targets consisted of 10 positive words (e.g., the words pleasant and 
positive) and 10 negative words (e.g., the words unkind and annoying). The same prime stimuli 
were used as in Experiment 2.  
Participants indicated their self-reported liking of Gandhi by answering two questions: 
“How much do you like or dislike Gandhi?” and “To what extent do you have warm feelings 
towards Gandhi?” on two 9-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (I dislike him a lot/Not at all) to 9 
(I like him a lot / a lot). After completing explicit liking ratings, participants in Experiments 2 
and 3 also reported how likely they would be to visit a Gandhi museum if they were in India on a 
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Highly unlikely) to 7 (Highly likely).  
Participants were then asked to complete some final questions. First, they indicated to 
what extent they believed the story they had read to be historically true on a 7-point Likert scale. 
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The second question asked whether participants had heard about Gandhi before participating in 
the experiment (response options: yes/no). In Experiments 2 and 3, participants also answered 
two separate questions asking whether they had previously encountered any positive information 
about Gandhi or whether they had previously encountered any negative information about 
Gandhi (response options: yes/no). Finally, participants indicated their previous liking of Gandhi 
by reporting to what extent they liked Gandhi before participating in the experiment on a 7-point 
Likert scale. Participants were then thanked for their participation and debriefed. Debriefing 
included informing participants that the text about Gandhi was adopted from historical sources 
but that they should still be critical about the content. 
Results 
Implicit evaluations 
IAT (Experiment 1). In accordance with Meissner and Rothermund (2013), trials were 
excluded when (1) participants emitted an incorrect response (18.0%), (2) response times were 
faster than 250 ms (0.5%), or (3) response times exceeded the 75th percentile of response times 
by more than three interquartile ranges (1.7%). IAT latencies were subjected to a 2 × 2 analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with Text (negative Gandhi text, neutral Gandhi text) as between-subjects 
factor and IAT Block (Gandhi-good block, Gandhi-bad block) as within-subjects factor. We 
observed a main effect of IAT Block, F(1,60) = 136.80, p < .001, η2 = 0.11. Participants were 
faster in blocks where Gandhi and good were assigned to the same key (M = 528, SD = 45) than 
in blocks where Gandhi and bad were assigned to the same key (M = 560, SD = 50), dz = 0.68, 
95% confidence interval of the differences (CI diff) = [-38, -27]. Importantly, however, we did 
not observe an interaction effect of Text and IAT Block, F(1,60) = 0.34, p = .56, η2< 0.01. 
Bayesian analyses indicated substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (reflecting the absence of 
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a significant effect), BF0 = 3.34. We also calculated IAT scores that integrated errors and RTs 
using the D4-algortithm recommended by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). On these IAT 
scores we also observed the compatibility effect (mean D score indicating faster and more 
accurate responses in the compatible block compared to the incompatible block = 0.65, SD = 
0.55), t(61) = 9.26, p < .001, dz = 1.18, but no moderation by the Text condition, t(60) = 1.03, p = 
.31, BF0 = 2.47, η2< 0.01. 
Fitting the ReAL Model on the IAT data, we obtained a good model fit for participants in 
both text conditions, median G²s < 5.32, ps > .26. The Re parameter of the model was significant 
in both conditions, indicating that cognitive recoding of the IAT categories contributed to IAT 
performance, ts > 10.87, ps < .001, dzs > 1.95. Importantly, the A parameter for Gandhi was not 
significantly higher than 0.5, indicating that IAT performance did not reflect expression of any 
positive attitude towards Gandhi in the negative Text group (M = 0.40, SD = 0.16) or in the 
neutral Text group (M = 0.37, SD = 0.16), ts < −4.74, ps > .99. This suggests that recoding 
processes hindered the IAT from capturing positive (or negative) implicit evaluations of Gandhi 
in both groups. We did not observe differences in any of the parameters between the two groups, 
ts < 0.79, ps > .43. 
AMP (Experiment 2). We calculated eight AMP scores as the percentages of ‘pleasant’ 
responses for each of the four prime type trials (i.e., trials with Gandhi names, Gandhi photos, 
neutral letter strings, and control photos as prime) at each time of assessment (i.e., pre-reading 
and post-reading). The AMP scores were subjected to analyses with item-based linear mixed 
effects (lme) models. Because these models allow us to control for possible effects of random 
factors they are often recommended for analyzing performance in (evaluative) priming tasks 
(e.g., Gast, De Houwer, & De Schryver, 2012). We tested a model that included Text (negative 
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Gandhi text vs. neutral Gandhi text), Content of Prime (Gandhi vs. control), and Time of 
Assessment (pre-reading vs. post-reading) as fixed factors and Participant as random factor. The 
inclusion of the variables Task Order (implicit/explicit evaluation task first) and Type of Prime 
(picture vs. text) as fixed or random factors did not improve model fit so they were not included 
in the analyses. The analyses revealed the crucial interaction effect of the three fixed factors, 
χ2(1) = 8.51, p = .004. To examine this interaction, we calculated an AMP score reflecting the 
difference between the proportion of pleasant responses after a Gandhi prime and the proportion 
of pleasant responses after another prime. The AMP score for participants who read the neutral 
Gandhi text was not significantly different before reading the Gandhi text (M = 0.20, SD = 0.30) 
compared to after reading the text (M = 0.17, SD = 0.26), t(87) = −0.81, p = .42, dz = 0.09, CI diff 
= [–0.09, 0.04], BF0 = 6.17. In contrast, the AMP score of participants who read the negative 
Gandhi text was significantly more positive before reading the text (M = 0.14, SD = 0.24) 
compared to after reading the text (M = –0.03, SD = 0.21), t(94) = –4.56, p < .001, dz = 0.47, 95% 
CI diff = [–0.20, –0.08], BF1 = 1083.71. 
EPT (Experiment 3). In line with standard procedures for analyzing evaluative priming 
reaction time data (e.g., Spruyt et al., 2007), trials with an incorrect response were dropped 
(2.8%) as well as any trials in which reaction times (RTs) were at least 2.5 standard deviations 
removed from an individual’s mean (2.9%). RTs were subjected to an lme analysis with Target 
(negative Gandhi text vs. neutral Gandhi text), Content of Prime (Gandhi vs. control), and Target 
Type (positive vs. negative) as fixed factors. We included a random intercept for Participant and 
Target Word and a random slope for Target Type by participant. The inclusion of the variables 
Task Order and Type of Prime as fixed or random factor did not improve model fit so they were 
not included in the analyses. We observed the crucial interaction effect of the three fixed factors, 
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χ2(1) = 4.78, p = .029. To examine the interaction we compared RTs for trials with positive 
targets and Gandhi as prime or with negative targets and other primes (compatible trials) to RTs 
for trials with negative targets and Gandhi as prime or positive targets and other primes 
(incompatible trials) for the two experimental conditions. For participants who read the neutral 
Gandhi text, RTs were faster on compatible trials (M = 622 ms, SD = 171 ms) than on 
incompatible trials (M = 634 ms, SD = 180 ms), χ2(1) = 9.58, p = .002, dz = 0.86, 95% CI diff = 
[−18, –5], BF1 = 17.62. For participants who read the negative Gandhi text, we did not observe 
this effect (compatible trials: M = 625 ms, SD = 181 ms; incompatible trials: M = 624 ms, SD = 
188 ms), χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .97, dz = 0.01, 95% CI diff = [−9, 9], BF0 = 7.51. 
Explicit evaluations 
Ratings of pleasantness of and warm feelings for Gandhi were aggregated into a single 
score by averaging the respective scores (Cronbach’s α = [.92, .94]) We submitted these scores to 
an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with Text as between-subjects factor and Previous Liking 
Score (Experiment 1: M = 5.60, SD = 1.55, Experiment 2: M = 5.22, SD = 1.11, Experiment 3: M 
= 5.05, SD = 1.27) included as covariate. In all experiments, the main effect of Previous Liking 
Score was significant, Fs > 13.12, ps < .007, η2s > 0.18. More importantly, we also observed a 
main effect of Text, Fs > 17.84, ps < .001, η2s > 0.23. Participants rated Gandhi more negatively 
when they had read the negative Gandhi text (Experiment 1: M = 2.97, SD = 1.67; Experiment 2: 
M = 3.04, SD = 1.43; Experiment 3: M = 3.03, SD = 1.31) than when they had read the neutral 
Gandhi text (Experiment 1: M = 4.91, SD = 1.77; Experiment 2: M = 5.69, SD = 0.85; 
Experiment 3: M = 5.42, SD = 1.16), ts > 12.41, ps < .001, ds > 1.98, BF1s > 10
5. 
Behavioral intention 
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For Experiments 2 and 3 we performed an ANCOVA on participants’ intention to visit a 
Gandhi museum with Text as between-subjects factor and Previous Liking included as covariate. 
The analysis returned a significant main effect of Previous Liking, Fs > 21.96, ps < .001, η2s > 
0.14, as well as a significant main effect of Text, Fs > 7.53, ps < .007, η2s > 0.08. Participants 
who read the neutral text indicated a stronger intention to visit a Gandhi museum (Experiment 2: 
M = 5.72, SD = 0.96; Experiment 3: M = 5.52, SD = 1.23) than participants who read the negative 
text (Experiment 2: M = 4.81, SD = 1.57; Experiment 3: M = 4.72, SD = 1.66), ds > 0.69, BF1s > 
296.67.  
Additional analyses 
All analyses were also performed for the subset of participants (Experiment 1: 75.8%; 
Experiment 2: 68.3%, Experiment 3: 45.0%) who (1) indicated that they had heard about Gandhi 
before, (2) gave previous liking ratings above the neutral mid-point of the scale and (3) had heard 
positive information about Gandhi before the experiment but not any negative information 
(Experiments 2 and 3). These analyses supported the conclusions of the main analyses, including 
the effect of Text on implicit evaluations in Experiments 2 and 3 but not in Experiment 1. 
Discussion 
The current experiments provide the first evidence that deep-rooted positive implicit 
evaluations of a highly familiar and unambiguously positive attitude object (i.e., Gandhi) can 
quickly change as the result of the acquisition of counter-attitudinal information. On a theoretical 
level, this finding contradicts the idea that changes in implicit evaluations require the gradual re-
wiring of acquired associations on the basis of repeated pairings of the attitude object with 
positive or negative events (Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 
2000). It only took a single piece of negative verbal information to override the effects of 
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extensive past learning on implicit evaluations of a well-known attitude object. The observed 
changes in implicit evaluation are unlikely to be attributed to selective activation of existing 
knowledge (Mitchell et al., 2003), as they were observed even for participants who indicated that 
they had never heard any negative information about Gandhi prior to their participation.  
The current findings suggest that mental representations underlying even deep-rooted 
implicit evaluation can rapidly integrate novel information, which strongly contrasts with the 
typical conceptualization of such representations as mental associations (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 
2000). Instead, the findings fit better with the idea that that implicit evaluation is driven by 
propositional processes. The observed changes in implicit evaluations of Gandhi might reflect the 
integration of new propositional information (e.g., the proposition ‘Gandhi caused the death of 
his own wife’) into a system of propositional knowledge, which is more flexible than slow-
learning associative systems. According to the propositional account of implicit evaluation (De 
Houwer, 2014), such newly acquired propositional knowledge can directly guide implicit 
evaluation. Alternatively, propositional learning might determine the formation of associations, 
as suggested by some dual-process accounts of implicit evaluation (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006). Yet, dual-process accounts cannot explain the current findings unless they 
incorporate the non-trivial assumption that the impact of newly formed associations via 
propositional learning can overrule the impact of previously formed associations on implicit 
evaluations.  
The current results accord with (and extend) recent studies that showed rapid changes in 
(newly formed) implicit evaluations on the basis of counter-attitudinal information (see Cone, 
Mann, & Ferguson, in press, for an overview). These studies provided evidence that the 
effectiveness of counter-attitudinal information depends on the diagnosticity of the information 
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(Cone & Ferguson, 2015) and whether the information facilitates re-interpretation of prior 
information (Mann & Ferguson, 2015). In the current study, we provided truthful information 
about Gandhi that we considered diagnostic about the valence of Gandhi. However, we did not 
probe characteristics of this information. An important direction of future research is to identify 
and examine properties of counter-attitudinal information that are crucial determinants of effects 
on deep-rooted implicit evaluations. 
On a practical level, the current findings add to research showing that a single piece of 
verbal information can have powerful effects on (automatic) behavior (e.g., Meiran, Liefooghe, & 
De Houwer, in press) and, specifically, implicit evaluation (e.g., Kurdi & Banaji, 2017). The 
findings suggest that not only newly established, but also deep-rooted evaluative behaviors can 
be changed quickly on the basis of information that contradicts previous knowledge. Importantly, 
the observed changes are not small and trivial but indicate important revisions of previous liking 
(e.g., moderate to large effect size differences between conditions: dz = 0.38-0.85). These findings 
set the stage for exploring the potential of using verbal information to modify other presumably 
deep-rooted behaviors that might depend on automatic evaluative processes (e.g., addictive or 
prejudice behaviors; see Smith & De Houwer, 2015, for an initial attempt in the context of 
smoking).  
The current findings also point to limitations of popular implicit evaluation measures. In 
contrast to the AMP and EPT, the IAT did not show any effect of the counter-attitudinal 
information on task performance. It is unlikely that this dissociation is (1) due to a lack of power 
in Experiment 1, as Bayesian factors indicated substantial evidence for the absence of an effect, 
or (2) due to sample differences, as the effects on other measures (i.e., explicit rating scales) were 
of similar size across the three experiments. A possible explanation is that IAT performance was 
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affected by non-evaluative processes. In line with this assumption, findings from the ReAL 
modeling analysis did not reveal any contribution of an attitudinal component to IAT 
performance in either of the text conditions and provided strong evidence for cognitive recoding 
of the IAT categories (see Rothermund et al., 2009). These findings are consistent with previous 
research showing that IAT effects can be driven by the ease to categorize concepts with the same 
key, which can depend on non-evaluative properties of the target stimuli (e.g., salience 
asymmetries, Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Another possible explanation is that IAT 
performance reflects normative or culturally shared knowledge (see Karpinski & Hilton, 2001) 
instead of personal liking. These confounds might explain why the IAT is sometimes 
outperformed by other implicit measures in predicting real-life behaviors (e.g., Spruyt et al., 
2015), as well as the observed lack of changes in implicit evaluations on the basis of counter-
attitudinal information in previous studies with IAT measures of implicit evaluation (e.g. Gregg 
et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2006). It is important to note that several studies have shown rapid and 
robust changes in IAT scores (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2003; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Gast, Smith, & 
De Schryver, 2016). However, a key difference with the current work is that those studies 
focused on recently formed evaluations of novel attitude objects or on evaluations of ambivalent 
attitude objects. It is possible that the mechanism that hindered the IAT from capturing 
evaluations in Experiment 1 (e.g., recoding) is more active when measuring evaluations of well-
known attitude objects with a (previously) predominant valence.  
Note that neither IAT, AMP, or EPT scores showed a full reversal of implicit evaluations 
on the basis of our manipulation. AMP and EPT scores were negative for participants who read 
the negative Gandhi text in absolute terms (i.e., participants provided more unpleasant responses 
to Chinese ideographs in the AMP and faster negative than positive target categorizations in the 
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EPT on Gandhi prime trials than on control prime trials), but this pattern was not statistically 
significant. This contrasts with these participants’ explicit ratings of Gandhi, which were 
significantly lower than the neutral mid-point of the rating scale. This might suggest that explicit 
evaluation is more strongly influenced by our manipulation than implicit evaluation, which could 
reflect differences in the processes underlying learning (or expression) of implicit and explicit 
evaluation. However, it is also possible that this dissociation is due to procedural or scoring-
related differences between implicit and explicit evaluation measurement that do not reflect 
differences in the underlying construct (e.g., only implicit evaluation scores are computed in 
comparison with control stimuli, only EPT scores are based on RT differences,…). In fact, 
interpreting scores from implicit evaluation measures as positive, neutral, or negative in an 
absolute sense is often considered arbitrary because these scores might not reflect the zero point 
on an underlying psychological dimension (for a discussion see Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). 
There were several limitations to the present research. First, we focused on changes in 
positive implicit evaluations. Because existing research suggests that it can be more difficult to 
change recently established negative than positive evaluations (e.g., Cone & Ferguson, 2015), it 
might be interesting to examine whether counter-attitudinal information can also lead to changes 
in negative implicit evaluations of highly familiar negative attitude objects (e.g., Hitler). Second, 
the current findings are silent about whether the observed changes in deep-rooted implicit 
evaluations persist over time or generalize across contexts. It is possible that negative information 
becomes highly accessible immediately after acquisition, when its impact on implicit evaluation 
peeks (but see Mann & Ferguson, 2017, for evidence that changes in newly learned implicit 
evaluations do persist over time). It is also possible that the observed changes in implicit 
evaluations are context-dependent (e.g., limited to the context in which they were learned, see 
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Gawronski, Rydell, De Houwer, Brannon, Ye, Vervliet, et al., 2017). This might occur when the 
newly formed representations underlying these implicit evaluations are contextualized (rather 
than integrated with previously existing representations) such that they bias evaluative responses 
only in the context in which they were acquired. Future research should examine the 
characteristics of changes in deep-rooted implicit evaluations (e.g., context-dependence, 
robustness) to provide more insights into boundary conditions as well as underlying cognitive 
mechanisms.  
A third limitation is that, although most participants reported that they could not explicitly 
recall having learned anything negative about Gandhi before participation, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that some participants did have (implicit) negative information available about 
Gandhi. Hence, it is still possible that changes in deep-rooted implicit evaluations resulted from 
the selective activation of previously learned (rather than novel) negative information. To explore 
this possibility, we performed a t-test analysis on AMP scores of participants in the negative 
Gandhi text condition of Experiment 2 (i.e., the only experiment for which we have data about 
participants’ implicit evaluations before and after reading the text). We found that the observed 
negative shift in AMP scores was not more pronounced for participants who indicated that they 
had heard negative information about Gandhi before.2 These results contrast with the idea that 
participants who have negative information available about Gandhi are more susceptible to 
changes in implicit evaluations.  
-                                                 
2 The negative shift in AMP scores after reading the negative Gandhi text was not more pronounced for participants 
who indicated that they had heard negative information about Gandhi before (N = 9, M = -0.03, SD = 0.32) than for 
participants who indicated that they had never heard negative information about Gandhi (N = 86, M = -0.15, SD = 
0.30), t(93) = -1.22, p = .89. Bayesian factors indicated substantial evidence for this null effect, BF0 = 5.81. 
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Finally, although Gandhi is a highly familiar target, attitudes towards Gandhi might be of 
low relevance to most people to the extent that it is unrelated to people’s self-interest or not 
central to their values. Future research could examine whether attitudes that are highly relevant to 
people can also be changed on the basis of a single piece of counter-attitudinal information.  
In sum, the present study demonstrates that the implicit liking of highly-familiar targets 
can be quickly changed on the basis of a single piece of negative information. Contrary to what 
some may think, even deep-rooted spontaneous preferences can be readily revised.  
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